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The modal scientific approach in consumer research is to deduce hypotheses from existing theory about relationships between theoretic
constructs, test those relationships experimentally, and then show “process” evidence via moderation and mediation. This approach has its
advantages, but other styles of research also have much to offer. We distinguish among alternative research styles in terms of their
philosophical orientation (theory-driven vs. phenomenon-driven) and their intended contribution (understanding a substantive phenomenon
vs. building or expanding theory). Our basic premise is that authors who deviate from the dominant paradigm are hindered by reviewers
who apply an unvarying set of evaluative criteria. We discuss the merits of different styles of research and suggest appropriate evaluative
criteria for each.
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For nearly as long as its existence, consumer research has
wrestled with questions about its mission, direction, bound-
aries, and relevance (Belk, 1984; Deighton, 2007; Folkes,
2002; Hirschman, 1986; Holbrook, 1985; Jacoby, 1976;
MacInnis & Folkes, 2010; Sheth, 1982; Shimp, 1994;
Simonson, Carmon, Dhar, Drolet, & Nowlis, 2001; Wells,
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for Cconcern over the perceived dearth of novel, far-reaching
consumer insights (Lehmann, McAlister, & Staelin, 2011;
MacInnis, 2011; Reibstein, Day, & Wind, 2009). We do not
hope to resolve this dilemma. We do however wish to
address a perceived malaise stemming from questions about
the nature of knowledge discovery. Such an objective
inevitably invokes a philosophical discussion about the rules of
science, but we are primarily concerned with the more mundane
rules of journals.
Our fundamental premise is that our discipline, although
nominally pluralistic about avenues to knowledge discovery, is
insensitive to the demands of different styles of inquiry and
inflexibly applies evaluative criteria relevant to the dominant
mode of inquiry to other legitimate approaches that are more
appropriately judged by different criteria. As a result, individual
researchers grow frustrated with the review process and,
moreover, scientific progress is inhibited. Our objective, then,onsumer Psychology.
5 In so doing, we acknowledge the important but relatively infrequent
methodological contributions made via the development of new procedural
paradigms (e.g., Mouselab) or novel statistical methods which require quite
different evaluative criteria. We also acknowledge the importance of non-
empirical papers, both conceptual and substantive, whose infrequent appearance
in the literature has been lamented and whose evaluative criteria have been
addressed (MacInnis, 2011; Yadav, 2010).
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recommend corresponding evaluative criteria.
Deduction and its discontents
The preponderance of empirical investigation in consumer
psychology can be characterized by the hypothetico-deductive
approach, a scientific approach that involves using theory to
formulate hypotheses that can be falsified with observable data
(Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1981; Lynch, 1982; Sternthal, 2010).
We contend that the dominant style has become dominant because
it is perceived to be more “rigorous” than other approaches.
However, analytic imperatives become counterproductive
when the value placed on research rigor and sophistication
exceeds the value placed on the importance of the research
question and the substantive insights provided by that
research, or, where “complexity is valued at the expense of
relevance” (Lehmann et al., 2011). As the problem pertains
to journal policy and the review process, both demands are
captured by Ellison's (2002; see also Rozin, 2009) distinc-
tion between q-quality and r-quality, the former “reflecting
the importance of a paper's main contribution” and the latter
“reflecting other aspects of quality (generality, robustness
checks, extensions, discussions of related literature, etc.”
(p. 995). Ellison's gloomy contention is that, for many years
and across a variety of academic disciplines, improvements
in r-quality have not been matched by increases in q-quality;
indeed, the perceived (and real) importance of r-quality has
resulted in a misallocation of researchers’ efforts and,
therefore, the improvements in r-quality have come at the
expense of q-quality.
We agree, but argue further that the perceived importance of
r-quality has not only influenced authors’ efforts, but has had an
unfortunate negative impact on the journal review process. As
pointed out by Ellison (2002) and Lehmann et al. (2011),
reviewers are inclined to focus on technical rigor (the r-quality) at
the expense of “importance” or relevance (the q-quality). This
tendency is not surprising, inasmuch as it is much easier to obtain
inter-reviewer agreement about technical issues, such as the
existence of a confound, than about the “importance” of the
findings. Assessments of q-quality require subjective judgments
of the magnitude of belief shift produced by the research and the
importance of that belief shift—judgments that can be idiosyn-
cratic due to differences across reviewers in terms of their prior
knowledge of the domain, appreciation of the implications of the
research, or beliefs about the discipline's priorities. Although we
discuss possible remedies to the loss of q-quality, we further
argue that assessments of r-quality or “rigor” can be biased by
methodological orthodoxy and that reviewers can suffer from
certain misconceptions even in these assessments.
Our goal therefore is to provide guidance to reviewers for how
to evaluate research so that q-quality is not neglected, and r-quality
is properly upheld but not overemphasized. Although we provide
guidance for traditional hypothetico-deductive research, our main
goal is to offer guidance for other paths to knowledge creation,
that we think might even offer more promise for higher levels
of q-quality, and where we think over-emphasis of andmisperceptions concerning r-quality are more problematic. In
the next section, we discuss different domains to knowledge
creation, and offer guidance for reviewers.Domains and routes
Our discussion is organized around two fundamental
dimensions: the domain to which research is intended to
contribute (to building or expanding theory or to under-
standing a substantive phenomenon) and the approach by
which the contribution is made (by starting with theory—a
deductive approach, or starting with phenomenon driven
observations—a non-deductive approach). The former is
well-known to consumer researchers but is formalized in
Brinberg and McGrath's (1985) validity network model,
which claims that all research involves elements and relations
from the conceptual, substantive, and methodological do-
mains. We restrict our discussion to research intended to
contribute to either the conceptual or substantive domains, and
we focus exclusively on empirical research.5 Such efforts
comprise the large majority of consumer research and are the
source of much consternation in the review process. The
second dimension, the researcher's approach to inquiry, has less
of a history but has recently become a topic of conversation. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to make a basic distinction
between deductive and non-deductive approaches. The combi-
nations of researcher intentions and researcher approaches to
inquiry produce four paths to knowledge, as shown in Fig. 1.
A key motivation for the present paper is our perception that
the community of reviewers within consumer research adheres to
the view that research should primarily make a “theoretical”
contribution, narrowly defined in terms of construct-to-construct
links. Research that illuminates links from constructs to phenom-
ena is viewed as merely applied (a view to which we take
exception). It is ironic that Brinberg and McGrath associated
“theory”with statements about relationships between concepts and
important substantive phenomena. Although we may look askance
at research that has no greater ambition than to “demonstrate” that a
psychological effect is relevant to consumer behavior, “theoretical”
contributions can be obtained from testing one or more
explanations of real-world consumer decisions, and important
contributions can be made by conceptualizing some substantive
consumer system in terms of constructs that have been investigated
in connection with very different phenomena.
In the remainder of this paper, we separately consider the
cells of Fig. 1, providing examples from the literature and
recommending evaluative criteria appropriate for each. Our
overriding assertion with regard to evaluation follows
Fig. 1. Four categories of inquiry.
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shifts one's beliefs about something deemed important.
We go one step further and argue that different varieties of
research attempt to shift different types of beliefs. We will
distinguish between updating beliefs about: a) construct-to-
construct links; b) construct-to-observable links; c) observable-
to-observable links; and d) beliefs that some phenomenon
“exists” in the world.
Conceptual contributions via deduction
Research from this category constitutes much of the
consumer psychology literature. The primary intention of
papers that follow the deductive–conceptual route typically
is to make claims about construct-to-construct relations
rather than claims about the relationship between concepts
and some particular substantive system. The defining feature
of such research is not the use of experimental methods but
rather a distinct lack of emphasis on the substantive domain.
The genesis of these papers frequently is the literature rather
than life (Lynch, 2011a), as exemplified by research on dual
process models of persuasion, regulatory focus, fluency,
construal level, priming, mindsets, and embodied cognition.
Despite the popularity and maturity of this category of
research, we feel there are still deficits in the way research in
this category is evaluated.
Criteria for reviewing
Research contributions from this category are generally
measured by the degree of belief shift induced about
construct-to-construct links as well as the reader's assess-
ments of the generality of those construct-to-construct links
and the importance of those links in updating or unifying
prior theory. We comment more on these points below. We
also argue that consumer research that makes a conceptual
contribution via deduction should be evaluated on its relevance to
a consumer domain.
Belief shift and “rigor”
When evaluating a paper's level of contribution, a chief
criterion is belief shift about construct-to-construct relations.The degree of belief shift is affected by the effect size and the
judged rigor of both the explanation and methods. Reviewers
often penalize a paper that has the potential to produce a large
belief shift because they judge it to have methodological flaws
that leave open alternative interpretations about construct-to-
construct links. Park (2012) refers to informative papers for
where there is ambiguity about causation as “cute” rather than
“beautiful,” and he attributes significant value to some of these
papers, despite their judged flaws.
However reviewers often state that such papers lack rigor.
Unfortunately, “rigor” can be a misunderstood and selectively
applied criterion. When reviewers suggest that the paper suffers
from a “fatal flaw,” they are obliged to offer an alternative
explanation for the data. And, indeed, reviewers experience
little difficulty in providing such explanations for deeply
flawed research. Researchers are more likely to be frustrated
with the review process when reviewers offer competing but
inferior alternative accounts for the research that the authors
earnestly and systematically conducted though they failed to
provide an airtight case. No research is perfect and, as neatly
articulated by Gordon Bower (2007), “It is a poor psychologist
indeed who cannot think of an alternative explanation for
almost any result.” To be damning, however, such alternative
explanations should be plausible and parsimonious (Sternthal,
Tybout, & Calder, 1987). In other words, they should be able to
explain all the authors’ data and not merely part of it. Quite
often, reviewers’ alternative explanation can account for only a
subset of the data (i.e., the results of some studies but not all).
An author's comprehensive and face-valid account should not
be trumped by a set of idiosyncratic explanations. Of course, it
is incumbent on the author to proceed earnestly and provide
reviewers with little fodder for such “fundamental reviewer
errors” (Lynch, 1998).
Less widely recognized is the Bayesian perspective on belief
change and rigor, which questions the unique roles of deduction
and falsification in theory testing (Brinberg, Lynch, & Sawyer,
1992). According to Bayes theorem, belief in a hypothesis should
increase if the hypothesis predicts a particular outcome, the
probability of the outcome is greater under the proposed hypothesis
than under a different hypothesis, and the outcome is, in fact,
observed. Consequently, findings that havemultiple interpretations
can nonetheless lead to a shift in beliefs about a theoretical
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to the parsimony of their multiple explanations but also to the
relative strength of a single competing explanation. Brinberg et al.
showed that “fatal” confounds may not be fatal; it can be logically
proper to have more belief updating from a high-powered but
confounded study with an alternative explanation than from a
low-powered study where the finding has no alternative explana-
tion. Most reviewers would be more persuaded by a study where
they see no alternatives.
Judged importance
It is necessary but insufficient for a paper to induce belief
shift about construct-to-construct links for papers that attempt
to make a conceptual contribution using deduction. The beliefs
must also be perceived to be “important,” frequently expressed
in terms of the “level of contribution” of the paper. Importance
can be attained from overturning prior theoretical accounts of
influential findings or from the perception that the construct-
to-construct relations are insightful in terms of the breadth and
depth of their explanatory power. Thus, whereas Aaker and Lee
(2001) made a significant contribution by demonstrating that
goals associated with approach and avoidance and self-view
can influence persuasion, the hundredth subsequent test of
regulatory focus theory in a persuasion context is likely to be
greeted with less enthusiasm.
Judged importance often coincides with the novelty of an
idea, but the literature shows that novelty is not a necessary
condition. Some “conceptual replications” have great heuristic
value for consumer researchers who either are unfamiliar with
the original source or who had not deeply considered its
deductions relevant to consumer behavior. Many such papers
tread a fine line between psychology and consumer research,
but it is essential that the judged contribution of these papers be
based on their potential to illuminate consumer behavior and
stimulate additional research beyond what would have been
observed in their absence—a criterion that is not easily met.
The ability to illuminate is a function of the distance between the
original and applied disciplines. Inspiration from a neighboring
field is likely to make a smaller contribution than is inspiration
from a distant field (e.g., signal detection theory). It is proper for
reviewers to judge a paper as not being sufficiently illuminating
so long as they appreciate that research can make a contribution
even if precedent exists in another discipline.
Theoretical novelty is expected to be high for papers with a
hypothetic-deductive approach. Such papers typically introduce a
new mediator or moderator of an existing relationship or process
(Colquitt & Zapato-Phelan, 2007). The most innovative ones
examine a previously unexplored relationship or process and
change beliefs about construct-to-construct relationships that had
been viewed as important in the literature (e.g., does involvement
decrease attitude change?) and/or introduce a new construct.
Losing the consumer
Research that pursues conceptual contributions via deduc-
tion typically makes the substantive area of application an
afterthought (Brinberg & McGrath, 1985). The consumer often
becomes a convenient context to study some more generalnomological relations. Consumer research has been defined as
“the study of people operating in a consumer role involving
acquisition, consumption, and disposition of marketplace
products, services and experiences” (MacInnis & Folkes,
2010, p. 900). However, some papers possess only a very
thin consumer veneer and cannot be readily distinguished
from papers that appear in general psychology journals.
Authors need to establish and reviewers need to assess the
relevance of the findings for increasing our understanding of
consumers.
It is noteworthy that the hegemony of deductive conceptual
papers, in which construct-to-construct contributions are prized
over explanations of real-world phenomena, has been criticized
from within the field consumer researchers wish to emulate
(Rozin, 2001). Unfortunately, willingness to snub the con-
sumer in consumer research may be proceeding in the wrong
direction. Lehmann et al. (2011) noted the trend in the broader
field of marketing to place increasing emphasis on technical
rigor at the expense of the (substantive) relevance of the
findings, which in turn has led to the recruitment of faculty
from basic disciplines whose interests are only loosely tied to
marketplace phenomena. These concerns could be applied
more narrowly to consumer research.Substantive contributions via deduction
We turn next to papers that also adopt a deductive logic
but intend to make their contribution not primarily by
illuminating construct-to-construct links but rather through
demonstrating and explaining substantive phenomena or
interventions designed to change or improve some real
world behavior. It is noteworthy that, in marketing journals
outside the realm of consumer behavior, papers focusing on
the substantive domain are disproportionately represented
among award winners, are disproportionately cited, and are
more likely than papers on construct-to-construct links to be
of interest to those in other fields and to the general public
(Lynch, 2011a; see also Lehmann et al., 2011). Such
“real-world” papers are not the norm within the realm of
consumer research. One reason pertains to a taste-related
preference for theoretical development at the expense of
application that, at its worst, results in findings that have
little substantive relevance or lack pragmatic actionability.
In addition to taste, however, we suggest real-world papers
are often judged on the basis of inappropriate evaluative
criteria.
Deductive approaches to understanding substantive phe-
nomena take two forms. In the first, one combines substance
and concepts to form a conceptual hypothesis and then finds
some appropriate methods to test the hypothesis. Critically,
these are hypotheses about phenomena and construct-to-
phenomena links rather than construct-to-construct links. The
second approach involves the engineering of important interven-
tions that are based on theoretic concepts from previous research,
not unlike the process of “intervention falsification” (Calder et al.,
1981). We discuss these approaches in turn.
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In what Brinberg and McGrath (1985) call the “theoretical
path,” researchers seek to explain a phenomenon in the
substantive domain by mapping relevant constructs to it.
“Theory” refers to understanding the phenomenon rather than
construct-to-construct links.
Many such papers start with observations of everyday
behavior or “stylized facts” to be explained, but the contribution
derives from successful application of existing theoretic con-
structs to explain the observations. For instance, Ariely and Levav
(2000) started from the everyday observation that when eating in
group settings, people tend to choose something different from
others at the table. They deduced that, if group variety loomed
large as a goal, those ordering last should be least satisfied
with their orders. Field experiments provided support for the
hypothesis that being in a group leads consumers to balance
individual and group related goals.
Other papers attempt to reconcile theoretical conflicts in a
literature regarding a substantive phenomenon. Maoz and Tybout
(2002) noted conflicting findings in the literature and conflicting
theories about whether moderately incongruent brand extensions
are evaluated more favorably by consumers than congruent or
extremely incongruent extensions. On the one hand, resolving
moderately incongruent information can result in task satisfaction
which can carry over to how the brand extension is evaluated. On
the other hand, consumers might logically be more likely to
transfer their positive feelings for the parent brand to the
extension the more they perceive a fit between the two products.
Maoz and Tybout reconciled these conflicting accounts by
positing that involvement moderates the effect of brand extension
congruity on evaluation. They argue that the task satisfaction that
results from resolving moderately incongruent information only
occurs when task involvement is high; when it is low, consumers
are likely not motivated enough to resolve the information.
Yet other theoretical path papers set out to test an interesting
conceptual question of substantive importance. Thus Krishna
(2011) studied consumers buying a product on cause market-
ing, where part of the proceeds from the sale of the product go
to a cause such as AIDS research. She tested whether such
purchases can decrease direct donation to the cause. Yoon,
Gürhan-Canli, and Schwarz (2006) provided a theory-based
explanation for the circumstances under which corporate social
responsibility activities may hurt, improve, or not change a
company's tarnished image. Papers in this vein are judged as
much on the importance of the phenomena they attempt to
explain as on the completeness and tightness of the explanation
offered, such as with the earliest attempts to understand brand
equity (Aaker & Keller, 1990).
Criteria for reviewing
Research contributions for papers of this type should be
measured by the degree of belief shift regarding an issue
deemed important, where key beliefs link substantive
phenomena to concepts. Rigor is strongly influenced by
judgments that essential features of the to-be-explainedsubstantive phenomena have been captured. Belief shift is
affected by the empirical force of the data in refuting a prior
conceptualization of the phenomena, as well as by the
readers’ priors about those phenomena.
Prior beliefs and perceived surprisingness
Two readers might have different judgments of the importance
of an “effect” if they begin with different expectations. Findings
from these papers can also be judged obvious if the focus is
inappropriately placed on construct-to-construct links rather than
the links from constructs to the consumer phenomenon of interest.
Consider Nedungadi's (1990) paper on the phenomenon of
consideration sets. Nedungadi argued that choice could be
explained not only by the status of competing options but
also by whether an alternative was considered at all. These
principles are remarkably powerful but may seem obvious
once stated. Nedungadi showed that “awareness” advertising of
a less preferred brand in a “niche” subcategory could actually
increase the share of the leading brand in the niche category by
cuing retrieval of that otherwise inaccessible subcategory and
then prompting retrieval of better liked alternatives in that
subcategory. Reviewers on this paper, failing to map memory
constructs onto the substantive problems of consideration set
formation and choice, objected that Nedungadi's deductions were
“obvious” because they followed from any network model of
memory. They misjudged the contribution by asking themselves
whether the paper caused updating of construct-to-construct links
rather than updating of links between constructs and important
substantive phenomena.
Familiarity, imagination, and judged “importance”
Just as readers can differ in their prior beliefs, they can differ in
their interest in the phenomena under study and in their ability to
derive additional interesting implications of the findings. In the
case of Nedungadi (1990), the editor and a reviewer differed
along these lines. To the benefit of consumer researchers, the
editor held sway and the paper has become the most cited paper
on consideration sets in the literature.
Clever empirical demonstrations are valuable in and of
themselves but also because they can prompt deeper
elaboration of the implications of those findings. Nedungadi
showed not only that choice is a function of what is—and
what is not—remembered; also choice dynamics may be
driven more by changes in consideration sets than by
changes in relative attitudes, the latter representing the
prevailing perspective at the time. Similar points can be
made about other papers whose goal has been to illuminate
the concepts relevant to understanding particular phenome-
na. For example, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) tested ideas of
emotional factors on self-control that followed closely from
previously made arguments regarding visceral influences
(Loewenstein, 1996) and “low road” versus “high road”
processes (LeDoux, 1996). However, substantial creativity
was involved in mapping those concepts to self-control
phenomena of substantial interest to consumers in the real
world, such as choosing between fruit salad and chocolate
cake. The resultant findings could be “obvious” to a reader
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be broadly illuminating to others with different backgrounds
who not only benefit from the empirical demonstration, but
who also are able to appreciate its implications for other
settings of interest.
Judgments about “importance” also stem from assessments
of the pervasiveness of the substantive phenomenon under
investigation and the reader's ability to see implications beyond
what was shown directly. Lynch and Ariely (2000) examined
the effects of lowered search costs for price and quality on
consumer price sensitivity. They showed it was true that price
sensitivity was increased by lowering search costs for price – as
many had observed. However, making it easy to compare the
wares of two retailers did not increase price sensitivity if the
products sold were imperfect substitutes rather than exact
duplicates. Readers who experienced similar belief shifts
from the empirical findings will naturally vary in their judged
“importance” of those belief shifts based on their personal
assessments of the pervasiveness, economic, and psycholog-
ical significance of explaining price sensitivity in online
channels.
A note on field studies and use of incentive-compatible
procedures
Because papers of this nature are judged on their ability to
illuminate a substantive phenomenon, clever field studies are
especially prized and valuable, as are demonstrations of effects
that use incentive-compatible procedures. Contrary to the
beliefs of many researchers and reviewers, however, the value
is not from an advantage in terms of external validity. External
validity is about whether some core result varies as a function
of some background factors. Unless a background factor is
varied, one cannot make any statement about external validity.
Researchers and reviewers are wrong to think that field
settings are homogeneous; if only a single setting is tested,
there is no more reason to expect that a finding from one field
setting will generalize to another field setting than that a
finding from one particular lab setting will generalize to some
particular field setting (Dipboye & Flanagan, 1979; Lynch,
1982, 1999).
Nonetheless, there are two reasons for awarding a bonus to a
paper for having included an ingenious field study or one that
uses an incentive-compatible “real behavior” procedure. First, the
study helps convince readers that concepts have been appropri-
ately mapped to the underlying substantive phenomenon. In
addition, readers may be drawn more deeply into the clever “real
behavior” study than to its companion studies and, as noted,
much of the judged contribution of a paper derives from the
reader's willingness to elaborate on the likely implications of the
findings. We therefore suspect that the persuasiveness of Ariely
and Levav (2000) was enhanced by field studies of a Chinese
restaurant and a brew pub that showed that because of their
group interactions, groups of diners and beer drinkers chose
more variety in the dishes they ordered than would be if
individuals made independent choices. Similarly, Wansink
and Van Ittersum's (2003) field test of the elongation bias
(i.e., elongated objects are perceived to be larger than lesselongated objects, and therefore people consume more from a
short, wide glass than from a tall, slender glass) appears to be
as well known as its laboratory-based predecessor (Raghubir
& Krishna, 1999).
Intervention falsification: theory-based interventions to influence
substantive systems
Field experiments occasionally have a goal not of explaining
some real-world behavior but of changing real world behavior
via a public policy or managerial intervention. These papers
have characteristics that Calder et al. (1981) associated with
“intervention falsification,” wherein constructs tested in a tight,
laboratory study are mapped to a noisy real-world environment
for the purpose of testing assertions about the observable-to-
observable mappings rather than adding any new insight on
construct-to-construct relations or attempting to pinpoint the
exact reasons why their interventions work.
For example, experimental and behavioral economists have
made significant contributions to consumer welfare and public
policy by using existing theory on intertemporal choice to
devise interventions that increase retirement savings. Thaler
and Benartzi (2004) have trade-marked a plan called Save More
Tomorrow, which asks people saving X% for retirement to
precommit to save X+Y% once given a raise. The authors
deduced from laboratory research on intertemporal choice that
people might discount the difficulty of making increased
contributions at a more distant point in time. They deduced
from prior work on the status quo bias and inertia that once a
soft precommitment had been made, people would be unlikely
to incur even a small cost to undo it if they discovered their
budgets were tighter than expected when the raise was received.
Results show a dramatic increase in annual savings rate for
retirement (3.5% to 13.6% over the course of 40 months).
Madrian and Shea (2001) deduced from a similar literature
on the status-quo bias that 401(k) participation would be
significantly higher under automatic enrolment; they used
interrupted time series to support that an auto-enrollment
intervention worked as expected.
The substantive contributions of these papers are self-evident.
In both cases, however, several explanations for why the
intervention works are possible (cf. Lynch & Zauberman,
2006). Such interpretive ambiguity is not a criterion that should
be used to evaluate papers of this sort. Few—if any—papers in
the consumer research literature have produced equally dramatic
effects on social welfare and public policy, yet we speculate that
any such papers would struggle in our review process because
reviewers would either misapply criteria for tests of hypotheses
about construct-to-construct links to this kind of work or
denigrate such “mere” application of existing theory.
Criteria for reviewing
The beliefs to be altered by theory-based intervention
research are not about constructs but about empirical relations
between interventions and real-world outcomes. Effect size
matters, particularly so in relation to the costs involved in the
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well-being (Brinberg & McGrath, 1985). The judged impor-
tance of the effects also depends on the prevalence of the
phenomenon. In this sense, an intervention that produces large
effects on retirement savings in 401-K programs might be
judged to be more important than a study that showed small
effects on participation in Christmas club accounts. More
attention is paid to the construct validity of the dependent variable
than to the construct composition of the independent variable.
What matters in intervention falsification is that the overall
package works, not which particular aspect of the intervention was
the central ingredient. Consequently, it is extremely important that
one can attribute the change in behavior observed to the
interventions and not to something apart from the interventions.
This is classic “internal” validity in the sense of Shadish, Cook, and
Campbell (2002), as distinguished from issues of construct validity
(trait and nomological) that are of concern when attempting to
explain results by constructs. The constructs are simply the
building blocks for creating the intervention. Intervention studies,
by definition, are completed in the field and often require grudging
cooperation from external partners. It is unreasonable for reviewers
to ask for minor revisions of the study in the casual way many
reviewers ask for new laboratory studies.
Conceptual contributions via non-deductive routes
A very different epistemological approach begins not with
formal theory but with strong hunches or simply with data (Alba,
2012). In this collection of methods the data precede rather than
follow theory. Many social scientists, consumer researchers
included, have scorned such papers as “atheoretical.” We
recognize the intensely empirical nature of this approach, but
we disagree that it has less scientific credibility. We also object to
caricatures of this approach, sometimes with the pejorative term
of “dust bowl empiricism” (McGrath & Brinberg, 1983), as
lacking in real or potential conceptual contribution. Given the
binary choice of having a conceptual explanation for an
interesting phenomenon versus not having one, we suspect that
the former would receive near-universal preference. The true
divide between the deductive and non-deductive camps revolves
around the need to have a tight conceptual account now.
Indeed, Haig (2005) outlines a sequence that moves from
theory generation to theory development to theory appraisal,
wherein scientific investigation begins with observation and the
probing of data for the presence of a surprising phenomenon
and is followed by a tentative but plausible theoretical account
of the phenomenon. To the extent that the investigator is
successful, the novelty objective is satisfied and a potential path
to deeper insight is identified. Note, however, that the process
succeeds even if it “fails.” If a phenomenon is uncovered that
resists a tidy theoretical explanation, it still endures. Haig
argues for the need to differentiate empirical from theoretical
progress and, accordingly, to recognize that the discovery of a
phenomenon is a notable achievement by itself—so much so
that more Nobel prizes have apparently been awarded for the
discovery of phenomena than for explanatory theories of those
phenomena. It should also be evident that the process is notonly at sharp variance with deduction but also falls short of
r-quality. The initial phenomenon may have no theoretical
foundation or precedent, and a documented explanation may be
a distant goal.
At the risk of reinforcing unfortunate stereotypes, non-
deductive methods range in terms of their thoughtfulness.
Serendipity anchors one end of the continuum, where discoveries
are completely unanticipated. Although there is no shortage of
scientific breakthroughs traceable to serendipity, we are reluctant
to endorse luck as a method. Nor, however, are we inclined to
denigrate luck or eschew attempts to capitalize on luck. With
regard to the latter, it is important to note that “planned” luck
offers not only a route to discovery but also a potentially efficient
route when massive probing can be performed at low cost.
Consider, for example, the process of “accelerated serendipity” in
chemical science wherein a very large number of chemical
reactions are tested without any forethought, but with the hope of
an interesting outcome (McNally, Prier, & MacMillan, 2011).
Consumer researchers may lack such laboratory techniques, but
they can avail themselves of data-mining.
Trial and error has similarly been portrayed as a witless way to
approach discovery, but the argument can be made that it occurs
with surprising frequency and may even be a preferred approach
in some contexts. Wasserman and Blumberg (2010) argue people
are inclined to attribute to creative genius discoveries that are
truly attributable to trial and error. Methods possessing a trial-
and-error flavor have recently been touted as the preferred
approach in business and policy contexts. Variously described in
terms of “adaptive trial and error” (Harford, 2011), “measure and
react” (Watts, 2011), “build-measure-learn” (Ries, 2011), and
“failing by design” (McGrath, 2011), the argument is that the
desired end state, i.e., a successful product or policy, is more
efficiently achieved through a bottom-up approach when
environments are highly complex and unpredictable. Proponents
of this approach do not eschew forethought but instead advocate
small-bore hunches that can be easily field-tested in both highly
scalable and highly constrained samples and that can offer insight
even in the case of failure.
Lest one conclude that what is good for application is not
good for formal science, there is evidence, at least from the
biological realm, that a similar logic is part and parcel of
everyday research. Dunbar (1999) reports that unexpected
findings are expected and that researchers deliberately design
experiments that allow for such findings—or, in his apt
phrasing, “the prepared mind favors chance.”
The process observed by Dunbar does not end with the
unanticipated finding. Good science requires additional testing and
speculation. The first reaction prompted by an unanticipated
finding is skepticism regarding method. Thus, methodolog-
ical explanations are advanced and tested. If the unanticipated
finding proves robust, investigators then advance hypotheses
and models.
If investigation is prompted not by a serendipitous experimen-
tal finding but with casual observation of the world or the musing
of an investigator about the relationships among constructs, the
process takes on an abductive flavor. The end result is a tentative
hypothesis that can serve as a starting point for a more formal
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starting with a set of observations and reasoning upward toward
a rule that can be subsequently tested through a falsification logic.
Alternatively, one may simply be satisfied with establishing the
robustness of a conceptual assertion, providing the discipline with
a stylized fact or empirical generalization.
Taken as a class, these informal routes to discovery present a
clear contrast to the traditional deductive logic of consumer
research. Papers that take these routes also struggle in the
review process due to their “atheoretical” nature. We lament
this state of affairs, in part because our own research has on
various occasions involved a fair amount of stumbling around.
For example, Alba and Chattopadhyay (1985) began with a
somewhat muddled set of data regarding the effect of brand
cues on brand recall. The relationship became clear and easily
explained once the data were reanalyzed using gender as a
blocking variable. Gender served as a surrogate for expertise
but was included in the design as a background variable with
no particular hypothesis in mind. The inclusion of back-
ground variables may more generally be viewed as a form of
prepared serendipity.
The mere-measurement effect (Morwitz, Johnson, &
Schmittlein, 1993), in which asking consumers about their
purchase intentions has an effect on subsequent purchase,
was not a serendipitous finding but one that qualifies as
“findings-first” research. After more than a decade of research, a
precise account of the effect remains elusive. In this sense it
mimics the hugely influential attraction effect reported by
Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) which, too, has been slow to
garner a definitive explanation. Such “atheoretical” findings-first
papers can be of exceptional heuristic value in alerting us to
topics of true importance (Lynch, 2011a).
Criteria for reviewing
Findings-first papers that bear on construct-to-construct
relations are judged based on belief revision of construct-to-
construct links. In this sense, they are like deductive concepts-
first papers, but they should not be similarly expected to have
those links nailed down. Measurement is not supposed to change
the phenomenon under study, but Morwitz et al. showed that
measuring intentions actually caused people to go out and buy
computers and cars. Typically, the finding itself is expected to be
inherently interesting in “findings first” research, so one is also
updating beliefs about whether some observed pattern is likely to
be observed in the world.
We detect some cracks in the deductive orthodoxy, but
findings-first papers will nonetheless face an uphill battle if
judged by deductive criteria (Park, 2009). In some instances,
the criteria are not far afield from those described earlier insofar
as the research maps onto some a priori theoretical structure and
can produce a belief shift about construct-to-construct links and
the judged importance of those links. For example, Huber,
Payne, and Puto's finding of violations of regularity led to the
rejection of broad classes of attraction models that could not
accommodate the “attraction” effect. If a puzzle or effect is
important enough or generative enough, reviewers should notrequire that the processes underlying the effect be pinned down
in order for the research to be published.
In other empirical approaches we have described, findings
and phenomena may have a less obvious a priori mapping to
theory (Haig, 2005; Wegner, 1992). Although we strongly
endorse discovery-oriented research, questions of validity
and robustness loom large. On the one hand, questionable
individual data points may eventually aggregate to produce a
robust and powerful meta-analytic conclusion. On the other
hand, evidence indicates that many initial findings either fail
to replicate or diminish in size over time (Hubbard &
Armstrong, 1994; Ioannidis, 2005). Moreover, there is reason
to question the self-correcting nature of science in those
instances in which a paper reports a Spartan data point
(Bertamini & Munafo, 2012; Ledgerwood & Sherman,
2012). Journals should not be an outlet for card tricks and
one-off results.
For the author, our position walks a line between torment
and trust. If a novel and important effect is uncovered, it should
be allowed to proceed to publication without addressing
reflexive calls to document moderation and mediation. Re-
viewers should also consider the logistical costs of replication,
especially for field studies (see above). On the other hand, it is
incumbent on the author to make a persuasive case that the
effect is not only important but also real, with replication being
the most natural route. However, even replication begs the
question of scope. In our discipline, the broadest scope, and that
which underlies empirical generation, is the use of multiple sets
of data gathered across contexts and laboratories (Ehrenberg,
1995)—a criterion few would regard as reasonable for a single
manuscript. It is not unreasonable for this criterion to take the
form of within-laboratory replication, which minimally can be
achieved via the use of separately analyzed replicates.
Aside from cost to the investigator, the degree to which
replication should be enforced is a function of other subjective
judgments that include: effect size, manipulation strength,
realism, elegance, and plausibility. Reviewers are entitled to be
skeptical when contrived manipulations and convoluted de-
signs produce small, head-scratching outcomes. A useful role
for editors and AEs is in setting the stopping rule.
Non-deductive substantive contributions
In some research, concepts take a backstage role because the
main focus is on documenting and measuring some particular
substantive phenomenon. Although psychological or economic
concepts are marshaled to interpret the dataset, the primary
objective is to show, in a careful way, that a phenomenon exists,
thereby paving the way for later studies of its explanation.
Consumer researchers seem to scorn such papers as “atheoreti-
cal,” but such papers are alive and well among our colleagues in
marketing science.
Lynch (2011a) noted that of the last 10 O'Dell Award
winners, half fit this template, as exemplified by Mela, Gupta,
and Lehmann's (1997) demonstration that advertising decreases
price sensitivity in the long run whereas price promotions have
the opposite effect. Various authors and people in practice had
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little new was shown about the role of constructs. The main
contribution is very carefully doing the econometrics to affect
beliefs about links between observables. More generally, there is a
rich tradition of “empirical generalizations” papers that carefully
show some stylized facts about themarketplace (Ehrenberg, 1995).
It is possible to add considerable confidence to beliefs about
some property of the substantive system by convincing readers
that the phenomenon in question has been precisely measured
rather than introduce new concepts. For example, the rigor with
which Mela et al. conducted their investigation was critical in
convincing readers of the validity of the result, allowing them to
turn attention to the significance of the facts for marketing strategy.
Whereas Mela et al. examined some longstanding specula-
tion on the part of practitioners and academics, other cases in
this domain may spring solely from the authors’ curiosity.
Bronnenberg, Dub, and Mela (2010) showed the surprising lack
of effects of TiVo on consumer price elasticity and purchasing.
In a three-year field study, some households were given a DVR
and their shopping behavior was compared to those without
one. The results showed that DVRs did not affect what people
bought, contrary to the intuition that DVRs would make people
skip commercials and become less price sensitive. Apparently,
people with DVRs watch the vast bulk of shows live, and even
when watching a recording they fail to engage the skip feature.
One's judgment of the contribution of the study comes both
from one's assessments of the care with which the phenomena
were modeled, one's surprise at the findings, and one's
judgment of how important DVRs are in the larger system of
advertising and marketing communication.
Other disciplines seem to value non-deductive substantive
contribution papers more than do consumer researchers. In
economics, consider Woodward and Hall (2012) analysis of
consumer confusion in the mortgage market. They showed that
brokers were exploiting borrowers’ lack of knowledge and
experience. They used empirical data on the compensation that
borrowers pay to mortgage brokers for assistance from
application to closing. They further showed that no rational
model of search could explain the distribution of broker
commissions, that borrowers sacrifice at least $1000 by
shopping from too few brokers, and that borrowers who
compensate their brokers with both cash and a commission
from the lender pay twice as much as similar borrowers who
pay no cash, presumably because mixing cash and commission
makes it more opaque to compare loans.
Such papers are equally important in consumer research
but often struggle in the review process, despite possessing
exceptional heuristic value in telling us what neglected topics in
consumer research might prove to be truly important. For example,
Dickson and Sawyer's (1990) now classic accounting of
consumers’ knowledge of supermarket prices battled to find a
home in a premier journal—it was viewed as “merely descriptive.”
Criteria for reviewing
In evaluating non-deductive substantive research, belief shift
may not always be the most important criterion. Rather, thereader makes a judgment about the degree to which the
methods capture the phenomena of interest. Thus, in a scale
development paper, evidence of reliability, convergent and
discriminant validity, and nomological validity enter into the
belief that the method “works.” Likewise, in an econometric
paper, the reader needs to be convinced that the estimation
method makes it possible to interpret the coefficients of interest.
There remains a separate judgment of the importance of the
phenomenon—which again is based on readers’ judgments
of the pervasiveness of the phenomenon and its psycho-
logical or economic significance. In the end, beliefs about
relationships among observables in a real world substan-
tive system are updated, not beliefs about construct to
construct links or mappings from substantive phenomena
to underlying constructs.
Concluding remarks
We have argued that consumer research has been dominated
by the hypothetico-deductive approach, wherein researchers
deduce from theory hypotheses about general construct-
to-construct links and then test those hypotheses with only
limited concern for the substantive consumer behavior systems
in which those links might be relevant. We respect the
underlying logic of research in this vein and have published a
fair amount of it ourselves. However, we also argue that a
methodological orthodoxy has taken hold—a not unfair
caricature of which includes mediation analysis even if
meaningless (Lynch, 2011b; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010), a
threshold number of experiments, a veneer of deductive logic,
the reporting of higher-order interactions, and the inclusion of
moderators. Authors, sensitive to r-quality, contribute to this
rigidity when they conclude that journals will be unreceptive to
departures from the dominant paradigm; reviewers validate
authors’ beliefs when they apply hypothetico-deductive criteria
to manuscripts that employ “non-traditional” approaches.
In particular, we highlight benefits of other deductive
approaches, particularly those for which the goal is to map
theoretic constructs to substantive phenomena (e.g., memory
principles can explain consideration sets) and those aiming
to shift beliefs about observable-to-observable links (e.g.,
people given a raise who precommit save more for retirement
because even if their budgets are tight they do not change
their saving plan).
We also highlight the merits of approaches that trace a
non-deductive path, where the chief insight or contribution
comes from the findings rather than from the tightness of the
explanation. Some such research aims to shift beliefs about
whether a particular phenomenon exists (e.g., measuring intentions
can actually cause people to buy expensive durables). Other such
inductive and abductive research contributes by altering beliefs
about construct-to-construct links (e.g., whether cues increase or
decrease recall depends on category size). We also acknowledge
that it would be a mistake to substitute one orthodoxy for another.
Yet for these papers to succeed and make it to publication,
reviewers need to apply appropriate criteria in the review process.
To that end, in this paper we have provided criteria for reviewing
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These criteria are also briefly summarized in Fig. 2.
We close with general remarks about the issue of how
non-traditional manuscripts should be evaluated. At a general
level, those who have lobbied for discovery and an emphasis on
phenomena are remarkably consistent. Framed in terms of risk
tolerance, Lehmann et al. (2011) and Wegner (1992) speak of
the need to shift the focus from being right and avoiding error
to not being wrong and pursuing truth. Cronbach (1986) argues
that bias should favor the viability of an idea except when the
costs of being wrong are intolerably high. Framed in terms of
contribution, the emphasis is placed on insightfulness
(Lehmann et al., 2011), “relevance, reality, and durability”
(Rozin, 2001; see also Lehmann et al., 2011), and novelty,Fig. 2. Four sets of critinterestingness, and net progress (Rozin, 2009; see also
Barwise, 1995).
Stated in terms of a currently popular research paradigm,
Cacioppo, Semin, and Berntson (2004) compare the prevention
focus of scientific realism, which skews toward deduction and
emphasizes theoretical specification, critical tests, and rigor, to
the promotion focus of scientific instrumentalism, which skews
toward non-deductive approaches and emphasizes discovery
and open-mindedness. Their overarching view aligns with our
own. These alternative perspectives should be viewed as
synergistic rather than antagonistic. In the end, precision is an
objective but not at the expense of discovery. Rozin (2009)
makes a similar point in the more specific context of the review
process. That is, the rules of “scientific hygiene” should not beeria for reviewing.
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topic. Doing so could prevent an idea from germinating.
As we have noted throughout this manuscript, there are two
dilemmas that produce reviewer disagreement (with each other
and with authors) about the contribution of manuscripts. The
first is widely known but virtually irrepressible. Insofar as
perceived novelty is a primary criterion, judgments of novelty
will be subject to the robust, stubborn, and seductive plague
of hindsight bias (Lynch, 1998; Shavitt, 2011; Slovic &
Fischhoff, 1977), which prevents reviewers from perceiving
any effect as surprising or, therefore, interesting. Although
debiasing is not impossible, we are not sanguine about
eliminating hindsight bias from the review process. It is the
job of editors and associate editors to realize the reasons for
reviewers having different priors. A paper can be important if it
shifts beliefs of a significant group of readers even if others
find it unsurprising.
The second dilemma pertains to risk tolerance and the need
for journals to be “not wrong.” As Cichetti (1991) states, “with
one review, editors “go with the flow,” with two, they “go with
the low,” and with three, they “go with the mode” (see
also Lynch, 1998; Park, 2010). Most often reviewers are
lukewarm, in which case they are expected to ask for changes
to the paper. Put another way, it is difficult for most reviewers
to suggest changes to q-quality but easy to suggest changes to
r-quality.
We close with an example of paper rumored to have been
published by the editor over the objections of the majority of the
review team. Goldenstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius (2008)
tested the effectiveness of signs put in hotel rooms that requested
guests participate in an environmental conservation program and
reuse their towels. They found that if the appeals on the signs
highlighted that other guests participated in the program (e.g.,
“the majority of guests reuse their towels at least once during a
stay”), hotel guests were themselves more likely to comply than
when the traditional signs that just focused on the benefits of
conservation were used. The authors concluded that descriptive
norms are more effective than the standard industry message to
induce compliance.
However, given the nature of the study, there was no way to
verify that the effect was driven by or mediated by a focus on
descriptive norms. Ideally one could examine which partici-
pants noticed the signs, assess how they rated them on
normative and other aspects, and then determine how the
normative ratings affected behavior. This, of course, was
impractical because participants in this field study did not even
know they were part of an experiment, getting the hotel to do
what was needed to conduct this field study was likely already
a Herculean feat, and trying to obtain follow up survey
measures from hotel guests would have been extremely
difficult, if not impossible. Yet, even without this additional
information, the contribution of this study is significant, and
was recognized with a Journal of Consumer Research Best
Paper Award.
If we desire to increase q-quality, we need to move away
from the flow-low-mode formula and move to a “champions”
formula. We need at least one reviewer to be very enthusiasticabout and champion a paper in order for q-quality to increase;
r-quality is less likely to spark enthusiasm than is q-quality.
This is especially important for phenomenon-driven research
since judging whether a phenomenon is interesting or important
to study inherently involves subjective evaluations and is likely
to have lower inter-judge reliability. Editors should strive to be
guided not by the average of what reviewers recommend but by
those who seem able to see the largest possible legitimate
contribution of the work.References
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